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Teton Dam failed during its first filling on 5 June 1976. The 405-ft high dam was designed and built using modern standards; therefore its 
failure received considerable scrutiny from engineering experts.  Failure mechanisms suggested, included hydraulic fracture, internal 
erosion, wet-seam theory, and defects in the abutment rock. None of the investigations, however, were able to explain satisfactorily why the 
dam breached when the reservoir reached EL.5301.7 ft and only in the vicinity of Sta. 14+00 on the right abutment. The investigation here 
is focused on this crucial aspect of the failure using the modern framework of fundamental “state based soil mechanics”.  According to this 
framework highly compacted soils of low plasticity in an environment of low liquidity index and low confining stress would crack in the 
presence of high shear stresses.  The impervious core (Zone-1) of Teton was constructed of uniform clayey silt of low plasticity and highly 
compacted and therefore was prone to such a possibility.  This paper describes the details of the theory, the investigation, and the 
conclusions arrived at regarding the potential initiation of Teton failure.  Finite element analysis carried out using state based parameters 
indicate the presence of deep open transverse vertical crack(s) in the core (Zone-1) to a maximum depth of about 32 ft from the crest only in 
the right abutment and in the vicinity of Sta. 14+00.  We conclude that once the water level in the reservoir rose above El 5300.0 ft in the 
early hours of 5 June 1976 water flowed through the open vertical crack(s), which slowly eroded the crack into a large tunnel leading to the 




The 405-ft high Teton dam was located in the high plateau of 
southeastern Idaho (Fig. 1). It failed during its first filling on 5 
June 1976. The “sunny-day” failure of  the dam  resulted in 14 
fatalities and a very large economic loss. Its failure was one of 
the most publicized events at that time involving a large earthfill 
dam built using current standards. Therefore, this failure received 
considerable attention from engineering experts around the 
world. However, the failure assessment and prognosis by experts 
including those by the Independent Panel (IP, 1976) and the 
Interior Review Group (IRG, 1980) failed to arrive at a 
consensus. Failure mechanisms suggested, included hydraulic 
fractures, internal erosion, the wet-seam theory, and defects in 
the abutment rock. There, however, remained an unanswered 
question as to why the dam breached when the reservoir reached 
El.5301.7ft and initiated only in the vicinity of Sta.14+00 on the 
right abutment. 
 
The impervious core/water barrier (Zone-1) of Teton was 
constructed of uniform clayey silt of low plasticity and low 
liquidity index. Highly compacted soils of low plasticity tend to 
crack in an environment of low liquidity index, low confining 
stresses and high shear stresses. None of the previous 
investigations focused on the possibility of the presence of 
cracks in the upper portions of the dam.  Such possibility is 
investigated here using the modern concepts of the fundamental 
framework of “state based soil mechanics” (Pillai and 
Muhunthan 2001, 2002).  The investigation consisted of 
laboratory tests on Zone-1 material to determine the physical and 
mechanical parameters and finite element analysis conducted 
using ABAQUS to simulate the field stress conditions. The 
results are used to identify the main cause of the Teton failure. 
 
 
Fig. 1.  Location map of Teton Dam (IP, 1976) 
BACKGROUND AND FAILURE OF TETON DAM  
 
The design cross section of the Teton dam at the river valley and 
the right abutment are as shown in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 respectively. 
The construction of the dam began in June of 1972 and was 
completed in November of 1975. The dam was conservatively 
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designed to have a wide impervious core with a head to width 
ratio of about 1.5 (Figs.2 and 3). The bedrock consisted of open-
jointed rhyolite and basalt but was well treated with blanket and 
curtain grouting. The abutment rock was trenched to provide a 
large core-rock contact and a long flow path to have a low 




  Fig. 2.  Design cross section of the dam at river valley section 







SURFACE MANIFESTATIONS OF THE DAM FAILURE 
 
On or before June 3, 1976 (Reservoir level was at or below El. 
5297 ft), no unusual signs of distress or springs or other 
increased seepage were noticed downstream of the dam. On June 
4, minor evidence of clear seepages appeared downstream, a 
good distance of 1300-1500 ft from the toe, which was consistent 
with the raising of the ground water regime due to rising 
reservoir water level. Late in the evening of June 4 (Reservoir 
El.5300ft), some dampness was noticed in the right abutment 
slope at El. 5200 ft. The following morning on June 5 shortly 
after 7:00 AM (Reservoir El.5301.3 ft) some muddy water was 
first observed to be flowing from the junction of the embankment 
and the abutment at El. 5200ft. At 10:30AM, a large leak of 
about 15 cfs appeared with a “burst” on the downstream at EL 
5200.0ft. The leak appeared to emerge from a tunnel of about 6 ft 
in diameter from inside the embankment and roughly 
perpendicular to the dam axis at Sta. 15+25. At about 11:00AM, 
a vortex appeared in the reservoir near Sta. 14+00 above the 
upstream slope of the embankment. At 11:30 AM, a sinkhole on 
the downstream slope (El. 5315.0 ft) developed near the crest 
and above the leaky tunnel. At 11:55AM, the crest of the dam 
began to collapse between the vortex and the sinkhole, leading to 
a full breach at 11:59AM (IP 1976). 
 
Fig. 3.  Cross section of the dam at the right abutment 
 
 
The impervious core (Zone-1) of the dam consisted of clayey 
silts of aeolion origin with low plasticity (PI ~ 4) and USCS 
classification of CL- ML.  As per the design and specifications 
Zone-1 material was placed at average water contents of 1.0% 
dry of optimum and compacted to a maximum dry density of 98-
102 % of the Standard Proctor test (Fig. 4).  Similarly the support 
zone (Zone-2) (chimney filter/drain) was compacted to a high 
relative density of the order of 65-70 % (IRG 1980). 
 
The first filling of the reservoir began October 3, 1975. The rate 
of filling of the reservoir was about a foot per day in the early 
stages; however, it was increased to about 3 ft per day for the 
most part of May and June 1976. When the dam breached on 
June 5, 1976 the reservoir had reached only El.5301.7 ft, which 
was about 22 ft less than the design full pool elevation. 
 
 
CONCEPTS OF THE NEW THEORY 
 
Past failure investigations of Teton have paid little attention to its 
fundamental soil mechanics aspects. We believe that the failure 
of the Teton dam belongs to a special class of rapid failures 
brought about by some locations of the highly compacted soils 
reaching a state of fracture. This fracture state is best addressed 
by the principles of state based soil mechanics (Pillai and 
Muhunthan 2001, 2002).  The origins of the state based soil 
mechanics approach lie in the modern concepts of critical state 
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soil mechanics (CSSM).  Detail accounts of the CSSM 
principles, the features, and finite element applications have been 
presented in a number of publications (Schofield and Wroth, 
1968, Schofield, 1980, Muhunthan and Schofield, 2000).  Soil 
behavior under shear stresses including rapid failures is 
described in CSSM using a normalized state space or 
equivalently using a normalized space of liquidity index and 




RUPTURE AND FRACTURE BASED ON “ STATE OF 
SOILS” 
 
Aggregates of grains that form natural and man-made soil 
deposits exhibit three distinct classes of behavior (Fig. 5); at 
large depths, high pressures cause ductile yielding of the 
aggregates and the layer of sediments to fold; above these depths 
and at lower pressures aggregates rupture and a layer of sediment 
faults with  the presence of gouge material along the slip planes; 
near the surface where the pressure is even lower, a layer of 




Fig.-6.  Limits of stable states of soils in (a) normalized q/pcrit - 
p/pcristress space stress (b) v – ln p space (Pillai and 
Muhunthan,2002) (schematic) 
 
Critical state soil mechanics divides the soil behavior at limiting 
states into three distinct classes of failure; the limiting lines OA 
and OG (Fig. 6a) indicate states of soils undergoing fractures or 
cracks; AB and GE indicate that Hvorslev’s Coulomb faults on 
rupture planes; BD and ED indicate Cam-clay yield and fold of a 
sediment layer. 
 
Soil states on the crack surface result in the development of 
unstable fissures and cracks openings. Heavily overconsolidated 
clays and overcompacted sands at low confining stresses could 
reach this limiting state.  Collapse similar to fracture on the 
dilative side can also exist on the contractive domain but outside 
the normal consolidation line (Fig.6b). Such states outside the 
stable yielding exist in wind deposited loose sands, air pluviated 
or moist-tamped sands and result abrupt collapse upon shearing 
of these materials (Pillai and Muhunthan, 2001, 2002).  For sands 
and clayey silts of low plasticity, stable yield behavior occur 
only within a narrow band on both the looser and denser side of 
the critical state line (Fig.6b).  
 
Fig. 5. Folds, faults and fissures in sedimentary deposits 
(Muhunthan and Schofield, 2000) (schematic)   
 
Critical state soil mechanics captures these simple depositional 
and structural phenomena of folds, faults, and fractures in soil 
and sedimentary as well as man-made deposits in a scientific 
manner. It explicitly recognizes that soil is an aggregate of 
interlocking frictional particles and the regimes of soil behavior 
depend in a major way on its density and effective pressure.   
The “no tension” or “limiting tensile strain” criteria are the most 
widely used among the alternative theories to quantify tensile 
fracture (Schofield 1980).  For the triaxial specimen the no 
tension criterion with σ3 = 0 results in p = σ1/3 or q/p = 3 and 
leads to vertical split cracks which is the case of line OA. For 
horizontally spalling cracks, σ1= 0 results in p = 2/3 σ3, q = -σ3, 
or q/p = 1.5 which is the case of line OG.  For clays or silty 
clays, Schofield (1980) had suggested that the change from 
rupture to tensile crack occurs at a pressure p = 0.1 pc, where pc 
is the effective confining stress at critical state.  This is 
equivalent an overconsolidation ratio of approximately 20 
 
In the critical state framework, the state of soils is defined in a 3-
D, mean effective normal stress (p), shear stress (q) and void 
ratio or specific volume (v) space.  Limits to stable states of 
yielding are defined by the state boundary surface in the 3-D, p-
q-e space. The 2-D representations of the normalized state 
boundary surface in the q/pcrit - p/pcrit and e - ln p spaces are as 
shown in Fig.6.  
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(Fig.6a)  
 
When the effective stress path crosses the crack surface OA, the 
soil element begins to disintegrate into a clastic body and 
unstressed grains become free to slide apart. In that case the 
average specific volume of the clastic mass can increase (large 
voids/cracks) and consequently its permeability can increase 
significantly and instantly. A significant internal/external shear 
stress at low confining stresses can cause the crossover of the 
crack-surface OA and a large increase in specific volume. When 
such condition occurs, the opening within the soil body may be 
an extensive crack or a local pipe or channel. If such opening 
(crack/channel) day lights into the water body it could lead to a 
free flow of water into the downstream slope. 
 
 
RUPTURE/FRACTURE BASED ON LIQUIDITY INDEX 
AND CONFINING STRESS 
 
Critical state soil mechanics (Schofield and Wroth 1968) has 
shown that it is possible to generalize the density or specific 
volume axis by converting to a liquidity basis.  It was further 
shown that the critical pressure is about 5 kPaat the liquid limit 
and 500 kPa at the plastic limit. In his Rankine lecture, Schofield 
(1980) mapped the remolded soil behavior on a liquidity against 
pressure diagram as shown in Figure 7 utilizing the hundred fold 
increase in pressure from the liquid limit critical state to the 
plastic limit critical state which is two log cycles, so the rupture 
band has half the width of PI and will intersect the line p = 5 
kPaat LI = 0.5.  This intersection is a consequence of putting the 
lower limit of Coulomb rupture at p/pcrit= 0.1 (Schofield 1980).  
In the LI-p space, clear boundaries exists that separate the 
regions of fracture, rupture, and ductile behavior.  This is an 
independent and convenient approach to separate the states of 
fracture/rupture/ductile yield behavior of the soil using its 









Considering a body of soil initially at LI = 0.5 and subjected to 
an elastic compression the map suggests at shallow depths where 
p < 5kPa there may be cracks, but for depths where 5 kPa < p < 
50 kPa the soil will remain water-tight while deforming. In 
contrast a body of soil initially at LI= 0 will undergo fracture at 
depths for which p < 50 kPa or about 3 m of the overburden 
depth. In other words, the overburden depth should be larger than 
3 m to ensure that deformation caused rupture planes (water 
tight) rather than open cracks.  If LI= -0.25, the depth could be 
about 100 kPa or 6 m of depth.  In this view the vertical face of 
the breach in Teton Dam can be seen as an open fracture in very 
strong soil, standing to a near vertical height of 6m or more. 
 
In order to identify the band of behavior in which various states 
of soil lie in the LI-p space, Schofield (1980) defined their 
equivalent liquidities by projecting these states in the direction 
parallel to the critical state line towards the ordinate through p = 
5 kN/m2.  The equivalent liquidity LI5 can be shown to be LI5 = 
LI+1/2 log (p/5) (Schofield 1980).  Therefore, the equivalent 
liquidity equals liquidity as found in the ground plus a correction 
for stress. A value of LI5 of less than 0.5 generally would 
indicate the fracture zone. Values of 0.5 to 1.0 represent the 
rupture zone. Values larger than 1.0 represent Cam-clay ductile 
zone.  
 
The inset of Figure 7 shows the section of the behavior map at 
constant p: stress ratios q/p will increase as equivalent liquidity 
falls.  In the high equivalent liquidity range, stress ratio increases 
linearly as liquidity of cam clay falls. The Hvorslev surface gives 
the rupture limits which allow higher stress ratios as lower values 
of p/pcrit are approached, but at the no tension limits, q/p = 3 in 
compression, and –1.5 in extension.  There is a general increase 
of limiting stress ratio as equivalent liquidity falls, but this is not 
a continuous change because there is a change of limiting 
behavior from contours yield, to discrete rupture , to fracture of 
stiff fissured soil at equivalent liquidity below 0.5 (Schofield 
1980). 
 
The above concepts provide two independent approaches to 
analyze the cracking of soils particularly in a dam. The first 
approach makes use of mechanical properties determined from 
triaxial tests and oedometer tests to separate the three regions of 
soil behavior, the fractures, the faults, and the ductile yield. The 
second approach relies on physical properties, plasticity index, 
and liquidity index to identify such regions.  The analysis herein 





A large database of field and laboratory tests carried out during 
the post-failure investigations by the IRG and the IP exists in 
their reports. The laboratory testing herein was focused on the 
verification of some of the index and mechanical properties. 
About 1000 lbs of the zone-1 material was obtained from the 
remnants of the failed Teton Dam.  The material was tested for 
physical and mechanical properties in the laboratory.  Tests for 
physical properties included grain size, plasticity (Atterberg) 
limits, and proctor compaction curves.  Mechanical tests 
included CU triaxial tests on remolded soils, UU triaxial 
compression tests, and consolidometer compression curves on 
compacted samples at wopt-1, wopt, and wopt+1 to obtain 
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constrained modulus at various confining stress levels. 
 
The soil material that formed the impervious core of the dam 
(Zone 1) was derived from aeloian deposits and consisted of a 
uniform clayey silt (CL-ML) of low plasticity (PI~4), 80 percent 
passing through #200 sieve and about 15% of clay fraction (<2 
micron). The average liquid limit (LL) was 23% and plastic limit 
(PL) was 19%. These values are plotted in Fig.-8 along with the 
idealized family of critical state lines for different soils.  It can be 
seen that the Zone-1 material conforms well to similar materials 




Fig. 8.  Family of critical state lines in terms of LL and PL 
(modified after Schofield and Wroth-1968) 
 
 
FEM ANALYSIS OF SOIL STATES AND “CRACK 
SURFACE” IN q-p STRESS SPACE 
 
Finite element analyses were carried out for the longitudinal 
section of the dam.  Longitudinal section was chosen because it 
captures all the variation along the bottom profile (berms, slopes, 
etc.).  Plane strain condition is assumed to prevail along the 
section.  
 
The analyses used an elasto-plastic model with modified cam-
clay yield curve (Roscoe and Burland 1968).  The CSL line with 
a slope M divides the yield curve into two regions, dry and wet 
sides.  Porous elastic option is used to describe elastic behavior 
inside the yield curve. It is assumed valid for small strains (<5%) 
and is a nonlinear isotropic model in which the pressure varies as 
an exponential function of volumetric strain. The model 
parameters used in the analysis are shown in Table 1. 
 
The model had five layers to simulate the construction of the 
dam. In the first step, the top four layers were removed and the 
remaining layer was analyzed. This was to allow the geostatic 
stress field to reach equilibrium with initial conditions, applied 
load, and boundary conditions.  Subsequently, each layer was 
activated strain-free to simulate the construction steps.  The 
strain free activation scheme was adopted to avoid creation of 
strain by the deformation of the previous layer.  From the 
analysis, the shear stress (q) and the mean stress (p) were 
obtained along the longitudinal section and contours of q/p ratio 
were drawn. 
 
Table 1.  Material Parameters 
 







p'c (psf) 3500  
 
 




E l. 5332 ft
E l. 5132 ft
E l. 4932 ft
C hainage along the longitudianal section of the dam


















Fig. 9.  Mapping of the contours of q/p stress-ratios and zones of 
potential crack(s) in the Cross-Valley Section   
 
 
ANALYSIS OF SOIL STATES AND “FRACTURE/ 
RUPTURE” IN LI5- p SPACE 
 
As described before, the transition of soil behavior from the 
crack surface region to stable Hvorslev fault region occurs at an 
equivalent liquidity index of 0.5 corresponding to a confining 
stress of 0.8 psi or 5 kPa; or zero liquidity index at confining 
stress of 8psi  (50kPa).  Similarly, the Hvorslev-Coulomb rupture 
regime changes to ductile Cam-clay regime at 80 psi (500kPa) 
(Fig. 7). This was further confirmed by a series of 
consolidometer tests with Zone 1 samples compacted at varying 
initial liquidity indices. For various confining stresses, the 
corresponding equivalent liquidity indices LI5 were determined 
and their position in the LI5-p space were identified. This was 
transferred to the cross-valley section for the respective 
confining stresses.  A mapping of the contours of equivalent 
liquidity index for the valley crosses section of the Teton dam 
was made as shown in Fig. 10.    
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Fig. 10. Mapping of the contours of equivalent liquidity index 





The state based soil mechanics theory presented here suggests 
that zones with stress ratio q/p larger than 3 would indicate the 
presence of a vertical split or crack (Fig. 6). Such zones can be 
identified for the Teton Zone 1 from the q/p contours shown on 
Fig.-9. These results clearly show that at the end of construction 
the dam core had developed such vertical cracks at two locations, 
Sta.14 + 50 in the right abutment and Sta.26 + 50 in the left 
abutment. The cracks at Sta. 14+50 were 32 feet deep from top 
of the crest while they were only 10 feet deep at Sta.26+50 (see 
Fig. 9). The state based theory further suggests that a contours of 
q/p ratio less than 3 would indicate the stable nature of the 
compacted soil which is the case for soil elements at depth and 
particularly below 32 feet (Fig. 9).  Therefore, we conclude that 
the failure of the Teton dam was initiated as a result of water 
flowing through an open vertical crack on the right abutment 
near Sta. 14+50 during the first filling, which slowly eroded the 
crack into a large tunnel leading to the major breach.   
 
The zone-1 core was capped by a 3-foot layer of sand and gravel 
roadbed which was subjected to continual vibration and 
compaction by the vehicular traffic inhibiting cracks in the layer. 
Further, the material parameters of the granular bed, their 
packing, and the characteristics were different from zone-1 
material to exhibit cracking.  As a result is was likely that the 
cracks below in the core zone apparently might not have day-
lighted onto the roadbed to be visible during  the first filling.  
However, numerous transverse cracks day lighted the roadbed in 
the left abutment soon after the dam breach, mostly near Sta. 
26+50, where the q/p ratio was near or larger than 3 for shallow 
depths. 
 
The map of the contours of liquidity independently confirms the 
above conclusions on the initiation of the Teton failure.  Fig. 10 
indicates shallow depths to about 30 ft between Sta. 14+00 and 
Sta.+ 16+00. 
  
Because of the low plasticity (PI ~ 4), the liquidity index was 
very sensitive to placement water content and its influence on the 
performance of the soil core, under rapidly changing confining 
and shear stress conditions, particularly at the abutments.  At the 
steep abutments, depth of the soil column decreases; 
consequently the soil elements were subjected to decreased 
confining stress.  In effect, the soil columns in the abutments 
were in the Hvorslev regime while those in the valley section of 
the dam were in or near the ductile (Cam clay) regime. Again the 
changes in the deformability were further disrupted by the 
benches, which apparently caused significant differential 
deformations and increased shear stresses at some locations.. 
 
In earth structures such as Teton dam, fill materials are generally 
placed at or near the optimum water content to achieve a high 
density.  The construction specification generally used the 
“optimum water content” as the reference point.  At this state the 
material is partially saturated (80-85%), near plastic limit (PL) 
(low liquidity index), has higher stiffness, constrained modulus, 
and strength.  For this placement condition, the state of soil 
(3>q/p> 1.2) remains in the Hvorslev regime of the stress-space 
(Fig. 6). However, if the placement water content is increased, 
the liquidity index will be increased.  Consequently the material 
will become less stiff and more ductile. With increased confining 
stress or water content, the equivalent liquidity index would 
increase and consequently the state of soil can quickly migrate 
into the Cam-clay yield regime (1.2>q/p>0). The soil would then 
deform with positive pore water pressure response. Because of 
the low plasticity index of the Teton core (Zone-1), small 
changes in water content played a significant role in altering its 
liquidity index and the mechanical properties including the 
potential for cracks/rupture and ductility.   
 
The concepts presented may also help explain some of the 
misgivings of previous investigations.  We believe that the 
hydraulic fracture ((Seed et al, 1976, Sherard, 1987) and its 
relevance to the failure of the dam is fundamentally flawed (See 
also Muhunthan and Schofield 2000). Except for the shallow 
depths of 30 to 35 feet in some location, the q/p stress ratio is 
significantly lower than 3 (fracture level), which indicates 
fracturing of the soil would be difficult with increasing depth 
(Fig.-9).  For hydraulic fracture to occur, the soil element must 
be subjected to seepage water, which can cause (a) physical 
wetting of the soil first and then (b) a corresponding hydraulic 
pressure in the soil. The physical wetting and saturation of the 
soil increases the liquidity index of the in-situ soil and 
consequently the soil element becomes more ductile and the 
material tighter and less permeable (Fig.7) (also the q/p ratio 
drops off quickly, Fig.6a). That is the stress-path moves 
significantly to the right to a more ductile and stable yield (Cam-
clay) regime. Some researchers (Leonard and Davidson, 1984) 
characterized this phenomenon as “collapse on wetting”, which 
is a misnomer considering that the stress path simply migrated 
from the stable Hvorslev regime to the stable ductile Cam-clay 
regime.  On the second point, (b), the hydraulic pressure due to 
the water seepage would have a limited opposite effect of 
reducing the effective stress of the soil element.  Any such 
reduction in effective stress due to the seepage pressure will be 
more than offset by changes in the mechanical properties 
(ductility) of the soil.  The net effect is that the movement of the 
stress-path of the soil element is to the right and towards the 
Cam-clay regime (Fig. 6). Therefore the notion of “hydraulic 
fracture” by water pressures equal or less than the reservoir head, 
which could initiate a failure of the dam has no scientific basis.  
 
We also conclude that the “wet seam” theory postulated during 
post-failure investigations (Leonards, 1987, Hilf, 1987) is 
fundamentally flawed. The majority of the core material on 
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Zone-1 was placed at a negative liquidity index (0.25 – 0.50) or 
in the Hvorslev regime in the stress-space (Figs. 6, 7).  When 
seasonal rains and snow condition interrupted the material 
placement during construction, some layers might have been 
placed at wetter than the average or near liquidity index of unity. 
When subjected to large stresses, such pockets of material would 
fall into the Cam clay ductile regime and deform like potter’s 
clay, “wet-seams” or wet-pockets producing positive pore water 
pressure. This was the case for a few random pockets/layers of 
fill that were affected by the rain/snow when full stripping and 
replacement of such layers were not possible during the 
construction.  Although such layers were of low strength and 
stiffness, they provide more impermeable mass relative to the 
surrounding material and would have had no adverse effect on 
the performance of the dam. 
 
The original design specifications of Teton dam stipulated 
placement water content of optimum minus 1% to optimum for 
the core which had only a small plastic index (PI<4). Based on 
our analysis, we believe that this was the fundament error in the 
design concept in leading to the demise of the dam. The 
placement water content represented an initial liquidity index of 
zero or negative, which allowed considerable depth of the core to 
be prone to fracture (Fig. 10). Without compromising the 
compacted density, for this material an additional one to two 
percent water content would have provided adequate equivalent 
liquidity index of at least 0.5 or more for most of the placed fill.  
This would have kept the entire fill intact in the Hvorslev regime 
where the material would have been stiffer, stronger and water 
tighter except for the top 5 to 10 feet (freeboard regime). 
Therefore, it is evident that the lack of knowledge at that time of 
the combined effect of liquidity and confining stress in 
controlling the mechanical behavior of Zone 1 contributed in a 
major way to the Teton dam failure.  For the design of earth-
structures, the theory based on the “state based soil mechanics” 
provides a better understanding of the physical and mechanical 
behavior of a broad spectrum of soils including that of Teton 





A new theory is postulated for the failure of Teton dam based on 
the concepts of fundamental soil mechanics. Based on our 
investigation and discussion, it can be concluded that: 
1. A transverse crack(s) or large opening(s) had developed 
in the core (Zone-1) to a maximum depth of 32 feet 
below the crest (top of the core) at the right abutment 
near Sta. 14+00.  The analysis further indicates that 
much shallower cracks existed in the core in both 
abutments under the steep rock slopes. When the 
reservoir level rose to the level of the deepest crack, 
water flowed freely barreling downstream into the 
chimney drain (Zone 2). 
2. The internal cracks might not have day lighted through 
the 3-ft thick granular roadbed which was subjected to 
constant vehicular traffic and compaction. Also, the 
parameters that affected the core were different from 
those of the overlying roadbed granular fill. 
 
3. The uniform clayey silt (CL-ML) that was used for the 
core of Teton dam fitted well into the CSSM model that 
was developed for other soils with different plasticity. 
Although the clayey silt had relatively high values for 
the liquid limit (LL~23) and plastic limit (PL~19), the 
plastic index was relatively small (PI~4 or less). 
Consequently the liquidity index was very sensitive to 
the initial placement water content and its subsequent 
changes in mechanical properties due to varying 
confining stress. This phenomenon was a significant 
contributor to the cracking of the dam. Therefore, for 
clay-silt cores, it is more prudent to have the 
construction specification refer the “placement water 
content” with respect to the plastic limit (PL), than of 
the optimum water content. 
 
4. A combination of material parameters such as the low 
plasticity of the core, the sensitivity of the liquidity 
index of the material to water content, its variation 
under the subsequent confining stress condition, and 
their influence on the constrained modulus played a key 
role in the cracking of the core.  It appears that these 
aspects of fundamental soil mechanics and the 
phenomenon of cracking were not recognized in the 
original design of the dam. 
 
5. The theoretical models based on “state based soil 
mechanics” used in this study provides a better 
scientific understanding of the mechanical behavior 
(stress-deformation) relating to the initial state of soil in 
the stress-space and the physical properties such as 
liquidity index and water content.  
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